UK Civil Aviation Authority

# Airspace Infringements: Causal Factors 2025

CAP 3277

This report has been written by the CAA's Airspace infringement Team. The Team comprises nine members and is part of the Directorate of Airspace and Air Traffic Management Infrastructure within the Safety and Airspace Regulation Group.

Like previous reports it will be published on the Airspace & Safety Initiative (ASI) website at airspacesafety.com/

The ASI is a joint CAA, NATS and MoD initiative to tackle major safety risks in UK airspace.

Published by the Civil Aviation Authority
Civil Aviation Authority
Aviation House
Beehive Ring Road
Crawley
West Sussex
RH6 0YR

June 2026

# Contents

# Introduction

An airspace infringement is the unauthorised entry of an aircraft into notified airspace. This includes controlled airspace, Special Use Airspace (SUAS), Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ), Radio Mandatory Zones (RMZ) and Transponder Mandatory Zones (TMZ).

Of the 1,136 reported airspace infringements in 2025, the Team had access to Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MOR)/Alleged Breach of Air Navigation Legislation Reports for all reported occurrences and over 1,000 pilot reports, whether in the form of pilot-submitted MOR, the infringement form (at airspacesafety.com) or via other document documents submitted to the CAA.

There continues to be a sustained downward trend in airspace infringement numbers in the UK with 2025 seeing a reduction of around 2% when compared with 2024 and an overall reduction of circa 20% since General Aviation activities returned to normal after the final COVID 19-related restrictions were lifted in 2022.

As can be seen by figure 1 below, reported airspace infringements now lie below the level in 2017 despite the introduction in more notified airspace since that date. Reporting of airspace infringement occurrences by Air Navigation Service Providers and Airspace Controlling Authorities/Sponsors continues to be carried out in accordance with UK Reg 376/2014 and the associated Implementing Regulation 2015/1018.




Figure 1

Of the 1,136 reported infringements in 2025:

- 818 related to G-registered General Aviation aircraft flown by pilots under the privileges of UK-issued licences;
- 113 (13.8%) infringements occurred where the Pilot-in-Command was a Flight Instructor during an instructional flight;
- At least 103 involved civilian aircraft (not including G, 2, M or N Registered aircraft) visiting the UK (a breakdown by state of Aircraft Register is below omitting G-registered aircraft for chart clarity) (Figure 2); and
- 60 involved military pilots flying military aircraft under the oversight of the Military Aviation Authority.




Figure 2

In 96 occurrences (8.6% of all occurrences), the pilot-in-command been involved in at least one other airspace infringement in the previous 2 years (as considered in accordance with CAP1404). When reviewing their most recent occurrence, a review of the education/training delivered following their previous infringement it was noted that 40 pilots (3.6% of infringing pilots and 41.7% of repeat infringing pilots) had undergone formal CAA infringement prevention training prior to their further infringement whilst 56 pilots (5% of infringing pilots and 58.3% or repeat infringing pilots) had been sent an education letter offering bespoke guidance to prevent a recurrence.

The following data was noted:

- 56 pilots had been sent an education letter;
- 8 pilots had completed the online tutorial and test;
- 24 pilots had completed the Airspace Infringements Awareness Course;
- 8 pilots had completed theoretical and practical flight training with a Flight Instructor (one having also been subject to a Provisional Suspension of their licence).

As well as detailing root causes and contributory factors of airspace infringements, this report will also serve to provide information to increase knowledge and understanding through the provision of web-links.

Based on the statistics that some 94% of airspace infringements, involved powered aircraft (Figure 3), as was the case in 2024, the findings below are naturally biased in that direction. However, many of the root causes and contributory factors are applicable to flights of all aircraft categories.




Figure 3

| Aircraft Class | Number |
|---|---|
| Aeroplane | 781 |
| Balloon | 6 |
| Gyroplane | 14 |
| Helicopter | 116 |

| Aircraft Class | Number |
|---|---|
| Microlight | 104 |
| Military | 64 |
| Paraglider/Motor | 7 |
| Sailplane | 26 |
| Unknown | 28 |

# Pilot Qualification

From data taken directly from licensing checks conducted as part of the CAP1404 casefile review process, a breakdown the type of licence held by the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) is at Figure 4 below.




Figure 4

| Licence Type | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Student | 2.70% |
| UK issued PPL/LAPL/NPPL/ATPL | 76.5% |
| Non-UK issued licence | 9.6% |
| Military | 5.6% |
| Unknown | 5.6% |

# Case Review Causal Factor Findings

In reviewing all reports, the Team again noted that the most common factors underpinning airspace infringement occurrences were as follows:

- Lapses in the application of effective Threat and Error Management;
- Lapses in pre-flight planning including the use of regulated meteorology and aeronautical information products;
- Lapses in flight management in Local Flying Areas;
- Lapses in the understanding of Air Traffic Services;
- Sub-optimal use of VFR Moving Map technologies.

# Planning and Threat and Error Management

In many infringement events, the Team noted that lapses in pre-flight planning and the application of Threat and Error Management were again the major root causes. In many cases, the pilot had either used their VFR Moving Map device as the sole source of planning or, in the case of Flight Instructors, no flight planning has taken place to and from the training area. Planning should incorporate the use of regulated aeronautical information products from the NATS AIS such as the most appropriate VFR charts and the UK AIP. In multiple cases, NOTAM briefings were not carried out or were completed without reference to the regulated source of NOTAM information at nats-uk-it.com/. It should be noted that not only does the Pre-flight Information Bulletin contain a list of relevant aerodrome and en-route NOTAM within the defined briefing area but there is also the ability to interrogate a map with NOTAM plotted. The CAA encourages the use of VFR Moving Maps as a tool in planning and flying in conjunction with regulated sources of aeronautical information to ensure that relevant information is captured across differing depictions and configurations.

When flying a route that requires changes in altitude due to, for example, CTAs and TMAs, it was noted that on multiple occasions, lack of planning/consideration of climb and descent points resulted in infringements. It is good practice to annotate on a chart climb and descent points that take into account the requirements of the airspace, the effects of headwinds and tailwinds and should incorporate the 'Take 2' guidance where possible; these points should then be noted on a PLOG and added as separate waypoints onto VFR Moving Map device to act as triggers. The Take 2 initiative (where possible, remain 2NM laterally and 200 feet vertically from the boundary of notified airspace) was introduced by pilots at a Local Airspace Infringement Team (LAIT) to help their fellow pilots and other airspace users. It is neither a buffer based on State policy, nor is its application mandatory; it is merely guidance based on the principle of good airmanship.

A sizeable number of occurrences resulted from pilots inadvertently exiting the confines of Local Flying Areas either vertically or laterally when arriving to or departing from aerodromes that lie within or proximate to controlled airspace. Main factors include:

- Lapses on carrying out effective monitoring of altitude and rates of climb when departing the aerodrome leading to a vertical infringement from the LFA;
- Insufficient consideration of aircraft performance when departing from the aerodrome leading to a lateral infringement from the LFA;
- Using an incorrect altimeter setting leading to a loss of situational awareness as to the aircraft's position in relation to the upper limit of the LFA; and
- Lack of situational awareness as to the construct of the LFA either laterally or vertically associated with lapses in detailed pre-flight planning.

In addition, it is important to include a detailed weather plan using regulated meteorological information from the UK Met Office aviation website (now the Met Office Aeronautical Visualisation Service) MAVIS (at metoffice.gov.uk/) using products such as

GAMETS and MetForms F214 and F215 in order to be able to anticipate any en-route weather. The Team noted several cases whereby pilots infringed airspace whilst avoiding conditions that were wholly forecast in resources available to them pre-flight. It was noted that in some cases, following review the MetForm F215, pilots did not consider the future locations of fronts and troughs based on the forecast direction and speed of movement when compared with intended flight time. In addition, the Team noted a general lack of the consideration of the risk of encountering isolated (ISOL) forecast weather along the route. Several cases were underpinned by lapses in both pre-flight and in-flight decision-making conditions ('press-on-itis') where an early decision to either cancel the flight, reverse course or divert would have prevented losses of situational awareness by obscured ground features or distraction/increased workload due to prevailing weather.

A large number of infringements (68) of the Transponder Mandatory Zones (TMZ) associated with the Stansted airspace complex resulted from either lapses in pre-departure preparation in not selecting the transponder to ALT, in not applying effective TEM associated with the airspace and in not being aware of the operation of the transponder equipment in the aircraft. The majority of these infringements occurred in TMZ-2 (56) with most relating to aircraft operating into/out of North Weald aerodrome. Pilots departing North Weald aerodrome are actively encouraged to carry out transponder checks prior to entering the runway and again prior to exiting the North Weald Area of Operations (AoO). In addition, checks of the transponder should be made prior to entering the TMZ when inbound to North Weald aerodrome or transiting the TMZ. If any doubt exists as to the serviceability or equipage of the aircraft, to mitigate an infringement of the TMZ, pilots should either communicate with Farnborough or Stansted Radar or enter/depart the TMZ via the North Weald AoO.

Other causal factors associated with pre-flight planning and Threat and Error Management that led to airspace infringements include:

- A failure to discuss the planned route with passengers so that their wishes can be considered/incorporated/rejected in the planning stage (in-flight changes often lead to distraction and misreading of altitudes on VFR Moving Maps.)
- Not effectively managing cockpit distractions during critical stages of flight leading to losses of situational awareness. Examples are:
  - Attempting to reset non-essential equipment when operating close to/climbing towards controlled airspace;
  - Passenger wellbeing/requests;
  - Over-focus on communication when the focus should be on handing the aircraft and navigating;
  - Carrying out student debriefs at sub-optimal times/locations; and
  - Over focus on noise abatement over airspace structures.

- In most cases of infringements of Restricted Area (Temporary), a final check, pre-departure, via the NATS AIS Information line on 0808 535 4802 could have prevented the events which resulted from a lack of situational awareness as to the existence of the structures.

## Links

- Pre-flight Planning Guidance: Pre-flight planning - Airspace Safety
- Easy Access Stansted Guidance: Flying in the Stansted area - Airspace Safety
- Easy Access Farnborough Guidance: Flying in the Farnborough area - Airspace Safety
- Easy Access White Waltham/London Control Zone Guidance: Hot-spot narratives - Airspace Safety
- Easy Access Northwest Guidance: Flying in the North West - Airspace Safety
- Easy Access Solent/Southampton Guidance: Flying in the Solent area - Airspace Safety

# Use of Air Traffic Services (ATS)

The Team categorises the use of Air Traffic Services (ATS) in 4 main categories as follows:

- Use of UK Flight Information Services (UK FIS) excluding London and Scottish Information;
- Use of a Frequency Monitoring Code (FMC);
- Basic Service from London and Scottish Information; and
- Operating autonomously.

Whilst the use of an ATS is not mandatory in much of the UK's Class G airspace, there remained a reluctance to obtain a service from Air Traffic Control. In analysis this reluctance has been found to be underpinned by the following main factors:

- Lack of confidence or perceived ability when communicating with Air Traffic Control;
- Limited capacity of some ATS units to be able to provide the requested type of service;
- Perception that a service is "pointless" as it is subject to 'limitations'; and
- Lack of understanding of UK FIS.

In the planning stage pilots should formulate a communications plan detailing from which Air Traffic Control Unit to obtain an Air Traffic Service and when that service can be obtained (considering areas of responsibility and Designated Operational Coverage (DOC)).

In the case of understanding, the Team note that there is a lack of understanding of the suite of ATS that together form the UK FIS; in particular, a pilot's responsibilities associated with airspace avoidance and the provision of a Basic Service. In addition, a large number of pilots elect to obtain a Basic Service from the non-surveillance equipped London Information where either a Lower Airspace Radar Service (LARS) or the use of an FMC could have either provided a mitigation to airspace infringements or, as a minimum, the ability to resolve the occurrence in a more timely manner by the relevant radar controller (see narrative number 23 at airspacesafety.com/hot-spot-narratives/). A lack of understanding as to the non-surveillance nature of London and Scottish Information was noted and, particularly with non-UK licensed pilots, a lack of awareness as to the difference in provision of service between London and Scottish Information and other European FIS providers.

## Links

- UK Flight Information Services CAP 774 – www.caa.co.uk/CAP774
- Lower Airspace Radar Service - https://airspacesafety.com/resources/

It was found that the use of an FMC is increasing in the UK. With some 26 codes now available in operation, with the correct use of the code, airspace infringements can either be prevented (where controller capacity permits) or resolved in a timely manner and, in many cases, prior to the occurrence leading to the use of safety intervention measures. Air Traffic Controllers are actively encouraged, when capacity permits, to apply 'defensive controlling' measures to offer information to a pilot whose track/trajectory indicates that an airspace infringement will possibly occur. However, this should not be expected, and it remains the pilot's responsibility to remain outside of notified airspace until a clearance or permission has been obtained. The Team noted from attendance at various LAIT meetings that defensive controlling techniques and the use of FMC in recent years has prevented an increasing number of airspace infringements, although conducting quantitative analysis is difficult as such prevented occurrences are not reportable under UK Reg 376/2014.

A number of infringements resulted from helicopter pilots departing into notified airspace without first obtaining a clearance from air traffic control/the airspace controlling authority. It is essential that pilots fully understand, as part of their pre-flight preparation, the requirements of the specific airspace controlling/operating authority prior to lifting on departure; specific consideration must also be made as to potential line-of-sight radio communication issues if communications only via the RTF is anticipated.

Where the use of a displayed FMC has been unsuccessful in resolving an airspace infringement, the cause has been either:

- Incorrect frequency selected;
- Radio volume has been lowered to either enable internal communications with a student or passenger; or
- Ineffective monitoring of the frequency.

## Links

- UK FMC card - https://airspacesafety.com/resources/
- FMC aide memoirs - https://airspacesafety.com/listening-squawks/
- Aeronautical Information Circular Y170/2025 - https://nats-uk.ead-it.com/cms-nats/opencms/en/Publications/

# Altimetry

The Team has observed a continued reduction in the number of airspace events resulting from the incorrect use of the Regional Pressure Setting (RPS) when flying in proximity to controlled airspace. Pilots should always remember that they are not obliged to operate on the RPS and are strongly recommended to request and set the relevant aerodrome QNH if an Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) or Flight Information Service Officer (FISO) issues the RPS for use where there is a more appropriate altimeter setting based on the airspace infrastructure. However, it is important that the pilot notifies the ATCO or FISO of the pressure setting being used and their altitude.

Two main causal factors related to altimetry noted in this reporting period were:

**1. A lack of Consideration of the Impact of Low Pressure**

- During periods of extremely low pressure, pilots inadvertently flew into controlled airspace which had a base defined as a Flight Level when operating on the local QNH. Pressure to height conversions in altimetry are based on International Standard Atmosphere (ISA). Independent of temperature, the conversion is 27 feet/hPa in the lower atmosphere (near ground). A NOTAM will be issued when the forecast pressure is 995 hPa or below; and example of such a NOTAM is below in Figure 5.
- During several infringements during periods of low atmospheric pressure, pilots' lack of situational awareness as to the vertical position of their aircraft was compounded by the vertical profile displayed on their VFR Moving Map. Pilots are reminded that GPS altitude is displayed on VFR Moving Maps, which is not usually as accurate as a correctly set barometric altimeter and will not accurately reflect the aircraft's position relative to airspace with a base defined as a flight level during periods of low atmospheric pressure.




Figure 5

## 2. A lack of Understanding of Transition Altitudes in the UK

- The Transition Altitude within the UK is 3,000 feet except in, or beneath, the airspace specified in the UK AIP ENR 1.7 (Altimeter Setting procedures) at paragraph 4.1. These transition altitudes are also shown in the UK AIP Aerodrome Directory in AD 2.17.

Around 10% of reported infringement cases were, on review, determined not to be infringements. Instead, the reported infringement resulted from unserviceable altitude reporting equipment, which incorrectly indicated that an aircraft was inside controlled airspace when it was actually operating below/above.

Good practice when departing an aerodrome is to set the relevant QNH prior to commencing your taxi and check again as part of your pre-departure checks; part of that check will incorporate ensuring that the altimeter reads the aerodrome elevation if using QNH (or zero if using QFE when departing to enter the visual circuit). Prior to flight (ideally before starting your taxi from your parking spot), it is also a good idea to check the accuracy of the pressure altitude that your transponder is reporting. To do this, set 1013 hPa on your altimeter sub-scale and check the altitude on the altimeter against the reading on the transponder. Remember to re-set the correct relevant altimeter setting before starting to taxi. In accordance with SAE AS8003 (ETSO-C88a) and ED-16, an aircraft's transponder and encoder are required to operate with a maximum permitted error of no more than 125 feet. As such the encoder (and therefore transponder) altitude and the indicated altitude on the altimeter must therefore correspond to within +/-125 feet.

# Use of VFR Moving Maps

There has been a continued increase in the use of VFR Moving Map technology in recent years which is a positive step in the prevention of airspace infringements, and an aspect supported by the CAA. The Team is now noting that, as with the previous analysis of 2023, there were either gaps in the understanding of some functions available on applications, or an over reliance in the technologies leading to a lack of situational awareness as to the progress of the flight should the device fail and skill fade both in dead-reckoning navigation skills and in planning using regulated sources of aeronautical and meteorological information. A lack of attention paid to the information that was being given, e.g. airspace warnings/alerts, was noted, particularly in areas proximate to airspace where pilots expect to receive such alerts. This was particularly evident in vertical infringements where the initial airspace alert was acknowledged/dismissed, invariably as the pilot was aware of the CTA/TMA above and then a subsequent alert was not provided during a slow climb or for a further time-period (depending on the product in use). This may be the reason many pilots reported the lack of a warning/alert immediately prior to an infringement when using some applications.

Other associated causal factors that led to airspace infringement as reported by pilots include:

- Lack of/inaccurate depiction on charts of information relating to airspace vertical limits, re-classification and NOTAM;
- Failure of devices due to overheating or depleted power;
- Overreliance on altitude alerts when flying below higher-level CTA/TMA;
- Using VFR Moving Maps as the sole source of planning. Moving Map technology should not be the sole means of planning or navigation as highlighted in the European General Aviation Safety Team, Safety Promotion Leaflet, Using Advanced Navigation Technology Safely (EGAST GA7 page 3 refers).
- Incorrect configuration of alerts including pre-flight connection to enable aural alerts through a pilot's headset.
- Over focus on devices leading to a loss of cockpit monitoring and loss of situational awareness of altitude changes.
- 'Alert fatigue' leading to pilots' selection of visual alerts on the device screen prior to mentally noting the subject.

It is also important to remember that Moving Map applications are not regulated by the CAA, and users should note that the depiction of aeronautical information on VFR Moving Maps may be different to the UK Aeronautical Information products accessed via the NATS Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) website, such as VFR charts, the UK AIP and NOTAM information (NATS AIS is the authorised source of UK aeronautical information provided on behalf of, and regulated by, the CAA).

The Team has previously been advised, by SkyDemon, to remind users that:

“As always, it’s worth reminding the end-user that NOTAMs were never originally intended for graphical depiction at all, so although usually SkyDemon will do a great job of deciding what should be depicted and how, we are working in an imperfect system and the pilot should always read the NOTAM brief, where of course this NOTAM would have been clearly displayed.”

**Links**

- Safety Sense Leaflet 29 – VFR Moving Map Devices;
- Using Advance Navigation Technology: GA7.pdf (europa.eu)

# Conclusion

The Airspace Infringement Team was fortunate to have received over 1,000 pilot reports to supplement MORs. An open and honest approach to reporting contributes to lessons learned and the advancement of safety for all.

From reviewing all occurrences, except those involving military pilots, the Team has made the following conclusions relating to root cause and contributory factors associated with pilot action/inaction which led to airspace infringements:

A lack of detailed understanding of the application of UK FIS and the provision of a Basic Service from LARS units and London Information was noted. This frequently presented as a false belief that the service provided will by means of observing on radar, prevent an infringement from taking place. On many occasions, the aircraft will neither be radar identified nor progress of flight monitored.

The increase in the number of FMCs in recent years demonstrates their effectiveness in reducing airspace infringements and limiting impact. Where capacity exists, air traffic controllers will endeavour to exercise ‘defensive controlling’ by offering advice to prevent an occurrence; where that is not possible, the use of an FMC has been proven to enable occurrences to be resolved quicker and often prior to a loss of separation of the application of safety intervention measures.

Altimetry still plays a part in many occurrences particularly on days when low pressure exists and when pilots are operating on the RPS. Whilst some service providers will issue the RPS to mitigate Controlled Flight into Terrain, pilots should not use that altimeter setting when operating under controlled airspace; instead, they should ask for the relevant QNH and advise the service provider of the altimeter setting they are then using.

Whilst the uptake in the use of VFR Moving Maps has increased significantly in recent years, it is evident that some pilots are unsure how to optimise their use and, instead of using them as a ‘blend’ in pre-flight planning, are using them as their sole means of planning and preparation. Not only are they unregulated, but their depiction of airspace boundaries, NOTAM and temporary airspace structures and aerial activity vary. The issue of alert fatigue is not unusual with pilots missing essential airspace alerts and warnings when cancelling/accepting significant numbers of other alerts. The hardware that ‘host’ the Moving Map applications are also subject to a number of Threats and Errors that can be found in Safety Sense Leaflet 29.

The two principal areas that underpin almost every occurrence are insufficient pre-flight planning/preparation and lapses in applying effective Threat and Error Management. With the increased use of VFR Moving Maps, some pilots feel there is a lesser requirement to give adequate lateral margins from the boundaries of controlled airspace. That, when coupled with the most significant Human Factors threat of distraction, increases the risk of a lateral infringement. See: Safety Sense Leaflet 31: Distraction.

Other Human Factors that have noticeable contributory factors in infringement occurrences are:

- **Confirmation bias** in examples such as:
  - Location in relation to a perceived recognition of a ground feature;
  - Expecting to have received a clearance (or information in relation to an ATZ) to enter the airspace;
- **'Press-on-itis'** either in marginal or poor weather conditions particularly when there is a perceived task pressure associated with time or when, in the case of aircraft rentals, the aircraft has been booked for some time, and the pilot has a perception that the flight must take place.

Planning should make use of regulated sources of aeronautical information such as the NATS AIS website to source NOTAM information, airspace and communication information. This should then be supplemented with aerodrome specific information from the Aerodrome Directory for licenced aerodromes along with valuable local-specific information from aerodrome websites. In addition, a great deal of useful information can be obtained during PPR and in discussion with aerodrome staff or referencing aerodrome operations manuals along with a final call to the NATS AIS Information line on 0808 535 4802.

In the planning stage, use of regulated meteorological information from the UK Met Office aviation site can mitigate many weather-related risks; in addition to the MetForms and GAMETS, the site offers METARs/TAFs and satellite imagery.

Appendix 1

# Reasons for Investigation of Airspace Infringements

The CAA's Infringement Coordination Group reviewed 330 airspace infringements during 2025 in accordance with CAP1404 (some of these events occurred in 2024 but due to reporting and casefile compilation the cases were not reviewed until 2025). These infringements were selected because:

1. The airspace infringement resulted in a loss of standard separation between air traffic operating within notified airspace and an infringing aircraft; or
2. The airspace infringement resulted in a safety implementation measure (controlling action) being initiated to establish or maintain standard separation between air traffic operating/intending to operate within controlled airspace and an infringing aircraft. It should be noted that this action is taken as a safety measure to prevent a loss of separation from occurring. This may include one or more of the following actions:
    - Avoiding action instructions;
    - Issuing of radar vectors;
    - Instructions to stop climb/descent;
    - Instructions to suspend SUAS operations;
    - Suspension of departures;
    - Implementing a 'Check' on departures (where free-flow departure operations are cancelled);
    - Issuing of traffic information.
3. The airspace infringement was carried out by a pilot who has been recorded as having previously infringed notified airspace within the previous two years as outlined in CAP1404.

The CAA's Airspace Infringement Team reviewed a further 664 airspace infringements. These occurrences were categorised as minor in accordance with CAP1404 as they did not compromise flight safety, there was no requirement for the implementation of a safety intervention measure, they involved a student pilot or where the pilot had not previously infringed.

In addition, 54 cases were closed without review as they involved military pilots operating military aircraft.

In accordance with CAP1404 and in line with a Just Culture, all case review outcomes focussed on education/re-training to assure competence and prevent a recurrence. A summary of decisions is at Figure 6 below.




Figure 6

| Summary of decisions | Number |
|---|---|
| No AI | 106 |
| Unknown | 40 |
| AI but NFA | 37 |
| Military | 54 |
| Student | 23 |
| Education Letter | 506 |
| Online Tutorial and Test | 24 |
| Practical Training | 56 |
| Airspace Infringement Awareness Course (AIAC) | 195 |
| Provisional Suspension | 7 |

Appendix 2

# 2025 Airspace Infringement Statistical Data

| | |
|---|---|
| **Total number of reported airspace infringements** | **1136** |

**Reported airspace infringements by airspace type**

| Airspace type | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Control Zones (CTR) | 17.4% |
| Control Areas (CTA) including airways | 46% |
| Terminal Control Areas (TMA) | 16.8% |
| Special Use Airspace: Prohibited/Restricted/Danger Areas (permanent and temporary) | 7.4% |
| Radio Mandatory Zones (RMZ) | 1.6% |
| Transponder Mandatory Zones (TMZ) | 3.8% |
| Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ) | 6% |
| G-registered aircraft in non-UK airspace | 1% |

**Number by airspace location with 5 or more reported infringements or an increase on 2023 figures**

| Airspace location | Number | Increase on 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| London Terminal Control Area (LTMA) (all areas) | 167 | |
| Stansted CTR/CTA/TMZ | 111 | |
| Southampton CTR/Solent CTA | 110 | |
| Farnborough ATZ/CTR/CTA | 88 | |
| Manchester CTR/CTA/TMA | 47 | |
| London CTR | 45 | |
| Birmingham CTR/CTA | 36 | • |
| Luton CTR/CTA | 36 | |
| Southend CTR/CTA | 34 | |
| East Midlands CTR/CTA | 27 | |
| Restricted Areas (Temporary) | 27 | • |
| Glasgow CTR/CTA | 24 | |
| Daventry Control Area (all areas) | 23 | • |
| Bristol CTR/CTA | 18 | |
| Hawarden RMZ | 18 | • |
| Edinburgh | 13 | |
| Channel Islands (includes all airspace in both FIR) | 13 | |
| EG D129 (Weston-on-the-Green) | 11 | • |
| Brize Norton CTR | 11 | • |
| Newcastle CTR/CTA | 10 | |
| Belfast & Belfast City CTR/CTA/TMA | 9 | |
| London City CTR/CTA | 9 | • |

| Airspace location | Number | Increase on 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Cardiff CTR/CTA | 8 | |
| Elstree ATZ | 7 | • |
| Liverpool CTR/CTA | 7 | |
| Scottish Terminal Control Area (STMA) (all areas) | 7 | |
| Leeds Bradford CTR/CTA | 5 | |
| Oxford ATZ | 3 | • |